About Looking is a NYRB reprint of the 1980 book containing 23 pieces that appeared in New Society, The Guardian, and Realities from 1966 on. It has a foreword by Tom Overton, who has just published a biography of Berger. Merve Emre, reviewing that biography in The New Yorker, has the same reaction I do to Berger’s writing: “In reading Berger, one discovers that his Marxist aesthetic is less a doctrine than a vague and ennobling justification for why he liked the art that he did.” And not just the art, but everything he looked at and thought worthy of writing about.
The fist essay, for example, “Why Look at Animals,” begins with the observation that with the Industrial Revolution, people started to be estranged from animals that once constituted “the first circle of what surrounded” them. We rarely even see an animal aside from pets, which Berger says are hardly even animals at all, “either sterilized or sexually isolated…limited in…exercise, deprived of almost all other animal contact, and fed with artificial foods” and dependent” on their owners “for almost every physical need.” What we lack is that moment when we look at a wild animal that looks back at us in the same way; fear perhaps follows, but first a question: is this a predator or is it prey? The look of the animal is thus “familiar.” Animals were “the first subject for painting.” They supplied Homer with short similes and extended metaphors. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries zoos were founded, demonstrating that society sensed the importance of staying in touch with what was once so important to us. But zoos are a failure. One doesn’t look at animals looking back at a zoo. Animals there are “lethargic and dull,” and they don’t look back. They have been “rendered absolutely marginal.”
Berger analyzes what happens when we look at war photos in “Photographs of Agony.” The observer’s “moral inadequacy” is realized as “lack of political freedom” and inability to “effectively [influence] the conduct of wars waged in our name.” The realization, Berger contends, lessens the shock of the photograph. But we need to go beyond the shock and the realization to action, to “confront our own lack of political freedom” and attempt to change it.
“Uses of Photography” is an essay Berger wrote as a kind of reaction to reading his friend Susan Sontag’s On Photography. He begins by pointing out that the illusion that a photograph gives us the truth, cannot lie, makes it useful as propaganda. The photograph captures an appearance only without a meaning, whereas memory preserves both. Instead of photography’s current uses by capitalism as spectacle or surveillance (Sontag’s words), Berger envisions a public memory that includes continuity and context with each image. He offers as a model Russian War Photographs 1941-45 where the text was written by A. J. P. Taylor (1978), where context is constructed by words and other photographs.
Berger has a series of essays that deal with particular photographers, painters, and sculptors, in each of which he ties the artist to a social and historical milieu and discusses the art’s engagement, or lack of it, with that milieu. Millet is an obvious example of the engagement, the first European painter to treat “rural labour as the central theme of his art,” Millet paints for “an urban and privileged public” and shows “the harshness of the peasant experience.” L. S. Lowry in England and Ralph Fasanella in Manhattan are examples of painters who follow this kind of engagement. Georges de La Tour and Rodin are examples of artists who did not. Often, he is insightful about the artists regardless of their engagement or lack of it.
Sometimes, however, his approach can be a bit strained, even while being insightful. Discussing “Magritte and the Impossible,” for example, he explains how Magritte uses “the language of the familiar” in order “to destroy familiar experience,” to depict an escape from the familiar and to show us “the sensation of the impossible such as we experience in dreams or states of half-consciousness” or in extraordinarily imaginative and creative moments. But in order to try to tie what Magritte is doing visually to some kind of social meaning, to try to make the depiction of the impossible a moral endeavor, he wanders into the meaningless:
Only through the interstices of the interlocking oppressive systems can we glimpse the impossibility of its being otherwise: an impossibility which inspires us because we know that the optimum of what is considered possible within these systems is inadequate.
But I found something of interest in every one of these essays, even if I was completely unfamiliar with the artist.
Berger became famous as a result of two things that happened in 1972. He won the Booker prize for his novel G. And he was the author and presenter of a BBC series called Ways of Seeing, later published as a book consisting of four essays and three pictorial sequences that present a Marxist challenge to conventional art criticism of the Kenneth Clark sort. Since Berger wrote, a lot of these attitudes have become a part of mainstream art criticism and can hardly even be called Marxist any more, including his notion of the “male gaze” presented in chapters two and three.
The first chapter reminds us that we have art works because there have been rich patrons and that their production and survival has much to do with capitalism. But since the age of reproduction (for the ideas in this essay come largely from Walter Benjamin’s 1936 essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”) the character of the work of art’s uniqueness, once tied to the place in which it resided, has changed: it is now unique in the sense of being “the original of a reproduction” and therefore valuable in the marketplace. So, the “meaning of the original work no longer lies in what it uniquely says but in what it uniquely is,” and it has in consequence a market value that masquerades as a spiritual value. Another consequence is the commodification of the reproductions, which are not only sold but used to sell other things. What is not clear from this discussion or from Benjamin’s is whether this change makes impossible a coming to terms with “what it uniquely says.” What is clear is Berger’s conviction that this change makes art liable to “mystification” that obscures its real nature in a cloud of words about universal values.
The second chapter is a wholly pictorial one: a series of images of women in art, “fashion,” and advertising. What the images do is present visually the thesis of the next essay, that women in art are presented as pictorial objects, and that the gaze that the viewer directs at these images is always male.
In that next essay, Berger deals with the difference between male and female presence, in the flesh and in art. Male presence is dependent upon power—physical, political, economic, sexual—or its potential, while female presence depends upon appearance and both her and her watchers’ consciousness of it. “Men act and women appear.” The consequence is that “The Survey of women…is male” and the surveyed female is turned into an object—and most particularly an object of vision: a sight.” Also in this essay, Berger is trying to demystify the nude in painting: he proposed in place of the Kenneth Clark formula (“to be naked is simply to be without clothes, whereas the nude is a form of art”) his own: “To be naked is to be oneself. To be nude is to be seen naked by others and yet not recognized for oneself. A naked body has to be seen as an object in order to become a nude.” And the conclusion is that “the ‘ideal’ spectator is always assumed to be male and the image of the woman is designed to flatter him.”
The fourth chapter, another pictorial sequence, seems to be a generic view of painting: the mother and child subject from Cimabue to Ford Maddox Ford, the depiction of death from Giotto to Manet, the still life, the mythological subject, portraiture and changes in the depiction of the individual subject.
The fifth essay comes back to the painting as a commodity that depicts commodities. “To have a thing painted and put on a canvas is not unlike buying it and putting it in your house.” Oil painting—the easel picture from about 1500 to about 1900—is a way of seeing that is also a new attitude about property and exchange. “Oil painting did to appearances what capital did to social relations. It reduced everything to the equality of objects. Everything became exchangeable because everything became a commodity.” This last sentence seems to be a tautology, and I am not sure I get the equation, but the relation is hard to argue. Berger suggests that many masterpieces have transcended the shackling of capital and oil painting—that “exceptional artists…broke free of…the tradition and produced work that was diametrically opposed to its values” but that “after their death, the tradition closed around their work.” Moreover, he says landscape painting has at times operated independently of the tradition. By the tradition, he means an ideology that looks at our obsession with property (and art’s service to that obsession) as natural—simply the way things are rather than as an aspect of our particular culture.
The sixth chapter is a pictorial sequence, again in the service of the essay that follows in the next chapter.
In that last essay, Berger discusses the relation of painting and advertising, which he often calls publicity. Publicity, he says, makes one claim—we will “transform ourselves, or our lives, by buying something more.” But the real promise is that buying it will make others envy us. What is the connection between this and oil painting? Advertisers “have understood the tradition of oil painting more thoroughly than most art historians.” Ads and painting use the same language: there are the same gestures in the ad models as in mythological figures, the same romantic use of nature, of the sea as escape and the Mediterranean as ultimate escape, the same stereotypes of women as the Madonna or the woman of action or the ultimate hostess or the sex object, the same physical stances of men indicating power or wealth, the same materials and surfaces—furs, leather and so on—of luxury. The glamour of fashion advertising is a modern invention, argues Berger, which is a depiction not just of a current idea of the beautiful, but of beauty being envied. Then we get the political implication: “Publicity turns consumption into a substitute for democracy.” The choice offered by advertising “takes the place of significant political choice. Publicity helps mask and compensate for all that is undemocratic within society.”
